Background Info
With strong communist bonds, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong were natural allies against the western democratic states. As the United States had backed Mao's political rival, Chiang Kai-shek, and was in the early stages of the Cold War against the USSR, the US presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Phillippines seemed an over-stepping of boundaries for both Communist leaders.
When the opportunity arose for North Korea to reunite (forcefully) with South Korea to form a single Communist state, it seemed an ideal opportunity for Stalin and Mao to reassert Communist dominance in the eastern sphere. Thus, both nations sought to support North Korea in its military efforts. The documents below provide insight into the military strategy and dynamics between the two nations.
When the opportunity arose for North Korea to reunite (forcefully) with South Korea to form a single Communist state, it seemed an ideal opportunity for Stalin and Mao to reassert Communist dominance in the eastern sphere. Thus, both nations sought to support North Korea in its military efforts. The documents below provide insight into the military strategy and dynamics between the two nations.
Primary Source Document #1 - Stalin to Mao Zedong: to communicate military strategy and the contributions of each the Soviets and Chinese. (5 July 1950)
PEKING, to the Soviet Ambassador
Pass [the following] to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai:
We think it correct to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer operations in North Korea in the event the enemy crosses the 38thparallel. We will try to provide the air cover of these units.
FILIPPOV
5 July 1950
Pass [the following] to Mao Zedong or Zhou Enlai:
We think it correct to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer operations in North Korea in the event the enemy crosses the 38thparallel. We will try to provide the air cover of these units.
FILIPPOV
5 July 1950
Primary Source Document #2 - Mao to Stalin: letter in which Mao accepts Stalin's offer of air support and further's the strategic exchange. (22 July 1950)
Top Secret
Enciphered telegram Extremely urgent to Filippov At 1430 22 July I received from Zhou Enlai the following telegram to you from Mao Zedong "To FILIPPOV. Having considered the issues of the air cover of the group of our forces on the border with Korea, the conversion of our aircraft to jet equipment, and the acceptance of the materiel and equipment of two Soviet air divisions we welcome your offer and express to you and the Soviet Government special appreciation for the air and assistance being offered. We intend to deploy a jet [aircraft] division designated by you to protect our troops in the area of Mukden, two regiments [in the area] of Anshan, and one regiment [in the area] of Liaoyang, which will allow the problem of protecting our troops and the industrial region of Mukden, Andong [Dandong], Fushun to be solved in coordination with the fighter regiments of our composite air brigade deployed in the area of Andong. It will be necessary to deploy a training center with a capacity to simultaneously train up to 60 men in order to realize the proposed retraining plan in a timely fashion, providing it with training materiel, visual training aids, and the minimum necessary number of instructors. We consider it advisable to send General-Major of Aviation Prutkov, our air force representative and senior advisor for air forces, to Moscow for the practical solution of these issues. Please inform me of your decision. With Bolshevik greetings - Mao Zedong". |
Guided Analysis Questions
- How would you describe the relationship between Mao and Stalin at this time? What piece of evidence from the above two documents best exemplifies this relationship?
- At this point, which nations are involved in the war in Korea?
Primary Source Document #3 - Stalin to Mao: Stalin outlines the United States position and speaks encouragingly about the war. (5 October 1950)
From cde. PHILIPPOV [Stalin]
October 5, 1950
I received your reply. I considered it possible to turn to you with the question of five-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard or a bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan against China.
While raising before you the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, and I was proceeding from the following considerations of an international character:
1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war [k bol'shoi voine];
2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans;
4) for the same reasons, the USA will not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries, as well as to abandon their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their springboard in the Far East.
In this regard, I proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if it were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy, and that without serious struggle and an imposing display of force not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan which at present the United States clings to as its springboard not for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who has no chance to succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.
Of course, I took into account also [the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [considerations of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.
Your reply contains one consideration about domestic situation in China that is new to me. You insist that, in case of a new war with regard to Korean events there will be many malcontents in the country, that there is strong longing for peace in the country. I understand it in such a way that the bourgeois parties that are part of the Chinese coalition may, in case of war, exploit discontent in the country against the Chinese communist party and its leadership. Of course, you should know the domestic situation in China better than anybody else. Would it be, however, possible to overcome the difficulties of internal situation in China or it would be impossible - only the Chinese comrades can decide it.
As to the arrival of comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, I would be happy to meet them and to have a conversation with them.
Respectfully,
PHILIPPOV
5 October 1950
October 5, 1950
I received your reply. I considered it possible to turn to you with the question of five-six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of a number of statements made by the leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies in support of the Korean comrades if the enemy were to cross the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea by the fact that China was interested in preventing the danger of the transformation of Korea into a USA springboard or a bridgehead for a future militaristic Japan against China.
While raising before you the question of dispatching troops to Korea, I considered 5-6 divisions a minimum, not a maximum, and I was proceeding from the following considerations of an international character:
1) the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war [k bol'shoi voine];
2) Japan, whose militaristic potential has not yet been restored, is not capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans;
4) for the same reasons, the USA will not only have to abandon Taiwan, but also to reject the idea of a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries, as well as to abandon their plans of revitalizing Japanese imperialism and of converting Japan into their springboard in the Far East.
In this regard, I proceeded from the assumption that China could not extract these concessions if it were to adopt a passive wait-and-see policy, and that without serious struggle and an imposing display of force not only would China fail to obtain all these concessions but it would not be able to get back even Taiwan which at present the United States clings to as its springboard not for Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek], who has no chance to succeed, but for themselves or for a militaristic Japan of tomorrow.
Of course, I took into account also [the possibility] that the USA, despite its unreadiness for a big war, could still be drawn into a big war out of [considerations of] prestige, which, in turn, would drag China into the war, and along with this draw into the war the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we should not, because together we will be stronger than the USA and England, while the other European capitalist states (with the exception of Germany which is unable to provide any assistance to the United States now) do not present serious military forces. If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA and when the USA and Japan will have a ready-made bridgehead on the continent in a form of the entire Korea run by Syngman Rhee.
Your reply contains one consideration about domestic situation in China that is new to me. You insist that, in case of a new war with regard to Korean events there will be many malcontents in the country, that there is strong longing for peace in the country. I understand it in such a way that the bourgeois parties that are part of the Chinese coalition may, in case of war, exploit discontent in the country against the Chinese communist party and its leadership. Of course, you should know the domestic situation in China better than anybody else. Would it be, however, possible to overcome the difficulties of internal situation in China or it would be impossible - only the Chinese comrades can decide it.
As to the arrival of comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao, I would be happy to meet them and to have a conversation with them.
Respectfully,
PHILIPPOV
5 October 1950
Analysis Questions
- When Stalin suggests "the USSR, which is bound with China by the Mutual Assistance Pact." - what is the Mutual Assistance Pact to which he is referring?
- What does Stalin believe about American war interests according to this document? Do any of the documents from an American perspective suggest Stalin is correct.
For further investigation:
Newly released papers suggest Mao and Stalin Alliance was uneasy
Sources Referenced
"TELEGRAM FROM FLIPPOV TO MAO ZEDONG AND ZHOU ENLAI." Wilson Center Digital Archive. Wilson Center, 5 July 1950. Web. 2 Apr. 2015.
"MESSAGE FROM STALIN TO MAO ZEDONG." Wilson Center Digital Archive. Wilson Center, 5 October 1950. Web. 2 Apr. 2015.
"MESSAGE FROM STALIN TO MAO ZEDONG." Wilson Center Digital Archive. Wilson Center, 5 October 1950. Web. 2 Apr. 2015.