As WWII was drawing to a close, the United States saw a shift in their relationship with the Soviet Union from one that embraced cooperation for mutual advantage, to one in which the USSR showed little regard for the interests of Washington and verged on defiance. In December 1943 Ambassador Harriman sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt that suggested a promising future through cooperation of each country's undercover operations and intelligence sharing: "the appreciation by the Russians of the advantages to be gained by such a reciprocal undertaking are quite apparent. They have advised us that certain of their intelligence material on Bulgaria is being sent to us and have in turn asked us for information concerning German espionage system."1 Ambassador Harriman hoped for a partnership between the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the corresponding Soviet entity. This partnership, similar to a pre-existing partnership between Britain and the Soviets, appeared imminent at the end of 1943. However, less than nine months later, Ambassador Harriman reported "Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last 2 months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown and unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems." 2 The USSR became adversarial towards the end of WWII as tensions regarding territorial divisions and post-war control in Europe escalated.
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"Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last 2 months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown and unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems." Ambassador Averell Harriman (10 September, 1944) |
Primary Source Document - Ambassador Harriman's dispatch to Roosevelt's close advisor, Harry L. Hopkins concerning American relations with Moscow (10 September, 1944)
"Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last 2 months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown and unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems....I have been conscious since early in the year of a division among Stalin's advisors on the question of cooperation with us. It is now my feeling that those who oppose the kind of cooperation we expect have recently been getting their way and the policy appears to be crystallizing to force us and the British to accept all Soviet policies backed by the strength and prestige of the Red Army...
I am convinced that we can divert this trend but only if we materially change our policy toward the Soviet Government. I have evidence that they have misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness, and acceptance of their policies.
Time has come when we must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our good will. Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved. This policy will reach into China and the Pacific as well when they can turn their attention in that direction.
The favorable factors are still the same. Ninety percent of the Russian people want friendship with us and it is much to the interest of the Soviet Government to develop it. When it comes to the question of what we should do in dealing with the situation I am not going to propose any drastic action but a firm but friendly quid pro quo attitude. In some cases where it has been possible for us to show a firm hand we have been making definite progress."
"Now that the end of the war is in sight our relations with the Soviets have taken a startling turn evident during the last 2 months. They have held up our requests with complete indifference to our interests and have shown and unwillingness even to discuss pressing problems....I have been conscious since early in the year of a division among Stalin's advisors on the question of cooperation with us. It is now my feeling that those who oppose the kind of cooperation we expect have recently been getting their way and the policy appears to be crystallizing to force us and the British to accept all Soviet policies backed by the strength and prestige of the Red Army...
I am convinced that we can divert this trend but only if we materially change our policy toward the Soviet Government. I have evidence that they have misinterpreted our generous attitude toward them as a sign of weakness, and acceptance of their policies.
Time has come when we must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our good will. Unless we take issue with the present policy there is every indication the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved. This policy will reach into China and the Pacific as well when they can turn their attention in that direction.
The favorable factors are still the same. Ninety percent of the Russian people want friendship with us and it is much to the interest of the Soviet Government to develop it. When it comes to the question of what we should do in dealing with the situation I am not going to propose any drastic action but a firm but friendly quid pro quo attitude. In some cases where it has been possible for us to show a firm hand we have been making definite progress."
Document Analysis Questions
- What is Harriman suggesting when he says "I am not going to propose any drastic action but a firm but friendly quid pro quo attitude"? Use textual evidence to support your answer.
- In what way is Harriman's prediction that "the Soviet Union will become a world bully wherever their interests are involved" threatening to the United States? How does this vision of the Soviet Union threaten American ideals?
Sources Referenced
- "Churchill and the Great Republic The Sword For Freedom." The Sword For Freedom. Library of Congress, n.d. Web. 7 Apr. 2015.
- Engel, Jeffrey A., Mark Atwood. Lawrence, and Andrew Preston. "Document 7.2 Toward a Harder Line." America in the World: A History in Documents from the War with Spain to the War on Terror. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2014. 159-60. Print.
- United States. CIA. Library. Memoranda for the President: OSS NKVD Liason. N.p.: n.p., n.d. CIA Library: Center for the Study of Intelligence. 22 Sept. 1993. Web. 8 Apr. 2015.